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IV 
I. STATEMENT OF TIlE CASE. 
A. NATURE OF TIlE CASE. 
This case is an easement dispute concerning a buried irrigation pipeline which has caused 
an actual impact to the Appellants' property of an appraised value of twenty-seven dollars and 
fifty- five cents ($27.55). The pipeline belongs to the Respondents Telford Lands LLC, Mitchell 
D. Sorensen, and PU Ranch (collectively, "Respondents,,).l Respondents are farmers who-like 
most farmers in Idaho-rely upon the diversion of water for the irrigation of their farmland located 
in Butte County, Idaho. 
The pipeline originates on land owned by PU Ranch, which has ground water wells owned 
and operated by Sorensen and PU Ranch, and from which Telford receives water pursuant to an 
authorized water supply bank lease approved by the Idaho Department of Water Resources 
("IDWR"). The pipeline then traverses a 1 OO-foot wide strip of property next to Highway 93 (the 
old railroad) which is owned by Donald and Carolyn Cain (collectively, "Cains" or "Appellants"). 
The irrigation pipeline is located just north of the Moore Canal, a facility owned and operated by 
the Big Lost River Irrigation District (hereinafter, "BLRID"). The irrigation pipeline and the 
Moore Canal are located approximately a half mile north of the home and business of the 
Appellants, who are both realtors/residential appraisers. There is a dispute over whether 
Appellants authorized the installation of the pipeline next to the Moore Canal. Eventually, 
1 In Appellant's Brief, the Defendants/Appellants refer to the Respondents collectively as the "Ranchers." The 
pipeline at issue in this matter is for the Appellants' farming operations, not for ranching. It would be accurate to 
refer to the Appellants as "farmers," but for purposes of this brief, they will be referred to as "Respondents." 
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litigation ensued after attempts to purchase the easement were unsuccessful due to the six figure 
dollar demands of the Appellants for the easement. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents permitting them to 
continue to have their pipeline go through the 100-foot railroad property pursuant to eminent 
domain. Appellants eventually stipulated that the actual value of the easement in dispute in this 
matter is twenty-seven dollars and fifty-five cents ($27.55), with a token value of five hundred 
dollars ($500.00). See R. Vol. 4, p. 759. After a decision on a motion for reconsideration, further 
proceedings were scheduled on the issue of whether the legal description provided by Respondents 
in a proposed order was appropriate, but Appellants did not challenge the surveyed legal 
description provided by Respondents when the district court provided the opportunity to do so. 
Appellants have now appealed the district court's summary judgment decision regarding 
whether Respondents can exercise eminent domain, which is the major issue on this appeal. 
Appellants have now also raised a constitutional due process issue for the first time, and alleged 
that the district court abused its discretion by not awarding Appellants their attorney fees. 
B. COMBINED STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT. 
1. Respondents are water users entitled to divert ground water for irrigation purposes on their 
respective farms, which are generally located south and west of Arco, Idaho, in an area 
commonly referred to as the "Era Flat." See R. Vol. 8, p. 1276. Until 2009, Respondents 
pumped their ground water into a canal owned and operated by BLRID known as the Moore 
Canal, and the ground water was delivered to their authorized places of use for agricultural 
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purposes. Respondents Telford and PU Ranch entered into transport agreements with 
BLRID for use of the Moore Canal. Id. 
2. BLRID has historically refused to enter into a transport agreement with Plaintiff Sorensen, 
on grounds that Sorensen's well was abandoned, despite having received a decree from the 
Snake River Basin Adjudication Court for the water right associated with Sorensen's well. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 111-12 (Letter from BLRlD to IDWR: "Using this well requires a transport 
agreement with BLRID which was not granted last year and will not be granted this year. 
The well was abandon and re-drilled in [a] different location."); See also R. Vol. 1, p. 117 
(portions of Mitchell Sorensen Deposition, p. 46, L. 5 through p. 48, L.I9). 
3. Respondents also determined that commingling of water in the Moore Canal often resulted in 
Respondents being charged significant, highly variable, and unexplainable conveyance 
losses on their ground water by BLRID. Respondents determined that a cooperative project 
would benefit all three parties, and make the project economically feasible for all parties to 
operate their own conveyance system. R. Vol. 8, p. 1276. The participation of all three 
Respondents was absolutely necessary because of the need for the combined water amounts. 
Respondents could then control their water supplies in the pipeline until it discharged into the 
portion of a seldom used canal known as the "UC Canal." Eventually, water in the UC 
Canal makes its way to the "Timberdome Canal," which is actually an abandoned portion of 
thelowerUCCanal, before it arrives on Respondents' farmland. R. Vol. I,p. 121-206. 
4. Prior to commencement of the project, Respondents determined which lands the pipeline 
would cross, and obtained easements from those landowners. R. Vol. 2, p. 317-18 
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(Deposition of Michael Telford at p. 9, L. 16 through p. 11, L. 23 summarizing efforts to 
obtain other easements from other landowners). As part of that process, prior to installation 
of the pipeline, Respondents' agent Boyd Burnett contacted Mr. Cain to inform him of 
Respondents' intentions to place the pipeline on Appellants' property, and to visit with him 
concerning the project. Mr. Cain consented to the work moving forward and it was Mr. 
Burnett's understanding that if an easement document was necessary in the future, 
Appellants would provide the same. R. Vol. 1, p. 173 (Boyd Burnett Deposition at p. 22, L. 
13 through p. 24, L.9); Preliminary Injunction Exhibit F (Affidavit of Boyd Burnett). 
5. In order to construct the pipeline, Respondents fIrst determined that they would need to cross 
underneath Highway 93, and located what appeared to be an abandoned 48" culvert located 
next to the Moore Canal crossing through which Respondents could place the pipeline. The 
culvert was entirely fIlled with mud and debris, which Respondents cleaned out, and the 
pipeline was then installed. R. Vol. 8, p. 1277; Preliminary Injunction Exhibits B and C. 
Respondents cleaned out the culvert only after receiving a permit from the Idaho 
Transportation Department to use the culvert. R. Vol. 2, p. 324 (Deposition of Michael 
Telford at p. 34, LL. 2-20 (describing permit from ITD). Upon discovering the pipeline in 
the culvert, BLRID objected to Respondents' use of the culvert, and asserted ownership over 
the culvert. BLRID ultimately unilaterally removed the pipeline, and thereafter, 
Respondents fIled suit against BLRID, wherein Respondents alleged that the culvert was 
abandoned and available for Respondents' use. R. Vol. 8, p. 1277, 1291-92. 
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6. Respondents and BLRID eventually resolved their dispute by entering into a settlement 
agreement set forth at Exhibit B to the Complaint (R. Vol. 8, p. 1290-1308), which required 
Respondents to cease use of the culvert, and instead required Respondents to bore 
underneath Highway 93 at a separate location in order for the pipeline to cross Highway 93. 
The settlement agreement provided that Respondents would no longer use the Moore Canal 
to convey their diverted ground water, and specifically allowed the existing transport 
agreements ofPU Ranch and Telford to sunset relative to their wells at the project site. Id. 
Sorensen did not have an existing transport agreement. R. Vol. 8, p. 1277. Therefore, 
Respondents, at significant expense, contracted with construction companies to bore 
underneath the Highway just north of the culvert and to relocate the pipeline to align with the 
bore hole location, all at additional expense. R. Vol. 8, p. 1277. 
7. Given the proximity of the pipeline construction to Appellants' home, the significant 
construction activities supervised by Terrell Kidd (preliminary Injunction Binder Exhibit E 
(Affidavit o/Terrell Kidd)), the work performed by Thomas Darland on Appellants' property 
which Mr. Cain requested when Darland was at the project site (Preliminary Injunction 
Binder Exhibit G (Affidavit o/Thomas Darland)), it appears that Appellants were aware of 
the construction activities relating to the pipeline installation. At the time of construction, 
Appellants voiced no objection to the project to the construction workers or Respondents. 
The pipeline was operational for the 2009 irrigation season. 
8. In late August or early September of2009, the Respondents learned that Appellants objected 
to the pipeline. Mr. Telford visited with Mr. Cain to discuss those concerns and to see if a 
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solution could be worked out. Mr. Cain was receiving pressure from his neighbors who 
were opposed to the project, and did not know what to do. R. Vol. 2, p. 317-19 (Deposition 
of Michael Telford at p.8, L. 8 through p. 17, L. 22). 
9. Three months after the pipeline was installed and operational, in mid-September 2009, 
Appellants, through counsel, objected in writing to the pipeline and demanded payment for 
an easement for the pipeline in the amount of$150,000.00. In response to the $150,000.00 
offer, Respondents attempted to negotiate in good faith, but could not reach an agreement to 
purchase the easement. Respondents believed Appellants' final offer for the easement of 
$105,000.00 was in substantial excess of the fair market value of the easement, particularly 
because the entire one-acre parcel under which the pipeline runs was purchased by 
Appellants in 1996 for $1,500.00. R. Vol. 1, p. 235-44, 181-98 (negotiation letters); R. Vol. 
1, p. 227 (purchase price information). 
10. On February 23, 2010, Appellants, now unrepresented by counsel, filed a small claims action 
against the Respondents (Small Claims Case No. CV-2010-20 in and for Butte County) for 
$5,000.00 for the eventual costs of removing the pipeline. After the small claims action was 
filed, Mr. Telford again went to Mr. Cain to attempt to work out a solution. R. Vol. 2, p. 
319-20 (Deposition of Michael Telford at p. 17, L. 23 through p. 20, L. 20). 
11. However, prior to the small claims action being heard, in late April of 2010, Mr. Cain 
damaged the pipeline by breaking a hole in the pipeline, and then sent letters to Appellants 
informing them of his self-help actions. R. Vol. 8, p. 1322 (photograph of the destroyed 
pipeline). The destruction of the pipeline occurred as Respondents had begun to plant crops 
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for the 2010 irrigation season. Respondents were in need of irrigation water for these crops, 
particularly because on April 14, 2010, the Governor of the State ofIdaho declared a drought 
emergency for Butte County due to low snowpack. R. VoL 8, p. 1314-16 (Order Declaring 
Drought Emergency). 
12. Respondents determined that it would be in their best interests to seek a TRO or preliminary 
injunction in order to fix the pipeline. However, prior to filing the injunction action, 
counsel for Respondents once again contacted Mr. Cain and offered $5,000.00 for an 
easement for the pipeline, which Mr. Cain refused. R. Vol. 1, p. 25. After hearing oral 
argument on the matter, the district court entered a preliminary injunction on May 20, 2010 
in favor of Respondents. R. VoL 1, p. 31-34. 
13. After entry of the preliminary injunction, Respondents and Cain (now represented by 
counsel) continued to negotiate in good faith for the purchase of an easement. No 
agreement was reached. R. Vol. 1, p. 200-05 (additional negotiation correspondence). 
After these attempts to negotiate for the purchase of the easement failed, Respondents 
proceeded with the action to acquire the necessary easement through eminent domain. 
14. On September 14,2010, Respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the 
count of eminent domain. R. VoL 1, p. 63. The district court granted Respondents' motion 
for summary judgment in a Memorandum Decision and Order dated October 20, 2010. R. 
Vol. 4, p. 674. At the time of the summary judgment decision, an evidentiary hearing was 
set for November 4,2010 on the issue of payment of just compensation. Appellants filed a 
motion for reconsideration on October 29, 2010, and sought additional discovery before the 
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filing of the memorandum in support of the motion. R. Vol. 4, p. 738. As a result, the 
evidentiary hearing on the remaining just compensation issue was vacated. On December 6, 
2010, the case was, for a time, administratively assigned to Judge Dane H. Watkins, Jr. R. 
Vol. 4, p. 746. 
15. After additional depositions of Scott Slocum of PU Ranch and Jim Rindfleisch, Appellants 
filed a memorandum in support of his motion for reconsideration. R. Vol. 4, p. 747. In this 
memorandum, Appellants stipulated to the determination of just compensation for the 
easement submitted by Respondents in the amount of $500.00 ($27.55 actual damages) 
based upon their appraiser's report. R. Vol. 4, p. 759. At the motion for reconsideration 
hearing, Respondents informed the court that they intended to have a survey performed of 
the easement at issue in the event the court upheld its prior decision on summary judgment. 
Tr. Motion for Reconsideration, p. 21, LL. 6-19. The court entered its memorandum 
decision and order denying the motion for reconsideration on May 26, 2011. R. Vol. 9, p. 
1524. 2 Respondents conducted a survey thereafter, and fmalized the survey legal 
description in late June of 20 11. 
16. In July of 2011, Respondents submitted a proposed order and judgment. By letter, 
Appellants objected to the proposed judgment and order because the proposed order 
contained the surveyed legal description. Appellants later formally objected to the 
2 The decision was inadvertently excluded in the record, and is the subject of a stipulation to augment the record. 
This decision should have automatically been included under LA.R. 28 (b)(1)(H). Citations to this decision in this 
brief will begin at Vol. 9, p. 1524 (the first page) through 1535 (the last page). 
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inclusion of the surveyed legal description in the final judgment and order. R. Vol. 6, p. 
1022, 1072. 
17. On August 23, 2011, the court granted Appellants' objection and ordered the parties to 
submit evidence or argument within fourteen (14) days as to the proper legal description to 
be included in the final judgment and order. The court also allowed the parties to schedule a 
hearing on the matter, which the Respondents did. R. Vol. 6, p. 1075. 
18. Respondents timely submitted evidence and argument. Appellants did not. On September 
29, 2011, the district court entered its order on the legal description issue, and signed the 
proposed judgment and order with the surveyed legal description. Id. Respondents 
thereafter withdrew their Motion to Amend Complaint Pursuant to lR.C.P. J5(a), which 
they previously filed out of an abundance of caution. Both parties then requested attorney 
fees, and both requests were denied. R. VoL 7, p. 1251. This appeal followed. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 35. 
Appellants have asserted the issues on appeal outlined in page 11 of Appellants' Brief In 
light of the arguments made by Appellants, Respondents assert the following additional issues on 
appeal pursuant to LA.R. 35: 
1. Whether Appellants, in this appeal, can discuss and argue from portions of the Rindfleisch and 
Harris Affidavits, which portions were struck by the district court and where no argument has 
been made to overturn the district court in that regard on appeaL 
2. Whether Appellants can argue that Appellants' due process rights were violated when that 
issue was never raised before the district court. 
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3. Whether Appellants can assert on appeal that Respondents' Complaint was deficient when 
Appellants were given an opportunity by the district court to challenge Respondents' proposed 
legal description and chose not to challenge the description. 
4. Whether Respondents should be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 40 and I.A.R. 41. 
III. ARGUMENT3 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Appellants have primarily appealed the district court's decision to grant Respondents' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relative to the eminent domain claim, as well as the district 
court's denial of Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment on their counterclaim for trespass. 
The standard of review before this Court is well established: 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same 
standard of review used by the district court in ruling on the motion. A grant of 
summary judgment is warranted where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." The moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of an issue as to 
any material fact. The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the 
non-moving party. 
Security Financial Fund, LLC v. Thomason, 282 P.3d 604,607 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
In addition: 
3 While the first eleven pages of Appellants' Brief are double spaced in compliance with LA.R. 36( c), the entire 
thirty-five page argument section of the briefhas a line spacing of one and a half, which does not comport with LA.R. 
36(c). Further, the bottom margin is one inch, not one and half inches as required under LA.R. 36(c). There are no 
procedures to object to these violations, but is appears this was done to permit additional room for argument in 
Appellants' Brief We note the objection here, and presume the Court will address it as it deems appropriate, if at all. 
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When an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court may, in ruling 
on the motions for summary judgment, draw probable inferences arising from the 
undisputed evidentiary facts. Drawing probable inferences under such 
circumstances is permissible because the court, as the trier of fact, would be 
responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial. However, if reasonable 
persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper. Conflicting evidentiary 
facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Losee v. Idaho Company, 148 Idaho 219, 222, 220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
B. Appellants, in this appeal, should not be permitted to substantively discuss 
and argue from portions of the Harris and Rindfleisch Affidavits because 
these portions were stricken by the district court on Appellants' and 
Respondents' motions respectively. 
Before proceeding to the heart of the appeal, there is a preliminary matter that must fIrst be 
addressed. Throughout these proceedings, Appellants have argued that Respondents, in a 
premeditated fashion, intentionally allowed the 2009 ground water transport agreements to sunset 
in order to create their own necessity in a future eminent domain proceeding with the Appellants, 
even though Appellants had not yet objected to the pipeline. See, e.g., Appellants' Brie/at 44 (". 
. . [Respondents] manufactured their own alleged necessity . . .") In an effort to provide some 
context to the agreement and demonstrate that this was not the case, counsel for Respondents 
attempted to introduce his own hand written notes from the settlement meeting with BLRID. 
After objection by Appellants, (Tr. Motion/or Summary Judgment, p. 105, LL. 12-25), the 
court concluded in its Memorandum Decision and Order to exclude the handwritten notes because 
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counsel would be testifying as a witness. R. Vol. 4, p. 677. The court's rationale was correct, 
and certainly with the benefit of hindsight, the attempt to introduce the notes was unwise. 
In addition, Respondents moved to strike paragraph 4 and the final sentence of paragraph 6 
of the Affidavit of Jim Rindfleisch, the BLRID manager, regarding his interpretation of a letter sent 
prior to his employment with BLRID, and his claim that the Respondents insisted on terminating 
the ground water transport agreements. The motion to strike was granted. After a deposition 
was taken of Mr. Rindfleisch, which was then relied upon in a motion for reconsideration on the 
motion to strike, the district court denied the motion for reconsideration and the evidence remained 
excluded. R. VoL 9, p. 1526-27; See also R. Vol. 4, p. 677 (Judge Tingey decision granting 
motion to strike). Nevertheless, even with the district court's decisions on these matters, on 
appeal, Appellants have taken the liberty to argue freely from the substantive items that were 
stricken. See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 7, 19,26, 43 (discussing handwritten notes and claims that 
agreements were terminated at Respondents' request); Id. at 19 (discussing Rindfleisch 
testimony). 
These arguments should be disallowed. On appeal, Appellants have not challenged the 
district court's decision to strike the notes and portions of Mr. Rindfleisch's affidavit. While 
Respondents' counsel would be happy to likewise freely discuss what his own handwritten notes 
mean, obviously this presents a difficulty the Appellants and the district court recognized. 
Including the stricken affidavits in the record on appeal in order to provide procedural background 
or to challenge the district court's decision to strike them would be appropriate, but it goes without 
saying that a stricken portion of the record cannot be substantively argued on appeal. See LA.R. 
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28( c) (Parties are permitted to include in the record on appeal "affidavits considered by the court . 
. . "). Because their exclusion has not been challenged on appeal, it is inappropriate for 
Appellants to use portions of these stricken affidavits to substantively support their position. 
C. The issue of whether the Appellants' due process rights were violated was not 
specifically plead in Appellants' counterclaim, there was no adverse ruling by 
the district court on this issue because it was not specifically raised before the 
district court, and it was not raised orally or in briermg on a motion for 
reconsideration. Therefore, because it has been raised for the first time on 
appeal, it should not be considered. 
The first issue on appeal asserted by Appellants is whether they were denied due process of 
law. Appellants' Brief at 11. The issue of constitutional due process was not addressed in any of 
the proceedings before the district court, and should not now be considered on appeal. Appellants 
claim constitutional issues were "discussed in the original summary judgment arguments and 
briefmgs before Judge Tingey in this case, as well as in the reconsideration motion heard by Judge 
Watkins." Appellants' Brief at 13. However, there is no citation to where the constitutional 
matters were discussed (either orally or in writing), and Respondents have not located any. 
This Court has held that "[t]o properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an 
adverse ruling by the court below or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an issue 
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 
317,323 (2003); see also Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 79 P.2d 303,306 (2008). As 
to such issues, including constitutional due process issues, "[i]t is well established that in order for 
an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis for 
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an assignment of error." Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 
236,245 P.3d 983,988 (2010). 
In Kolar v. Cassia County, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (2005), the appellant asserted 
error made by the district court on the issue of whether due process rights had been violated. Id. at 
354, 127 P.3d at 970. The district court never ruled on the claim, and therefore, "the question 
becomes whether the issue was properly raised. This, in turn, depends upon what the meaning of 
the word 'raised' is." Id. 
In Kolar, the relevant considerations were that the due process claim was raised orally by 
counsel at the summary judgment hearing (but no briefing was provided), and it was argued and 
briefed on a motion for reconsideration, even though the district court did not ultimately issue a 
decision on the matter. Id. The appellant argued his due process rights had been violated and 
this issue was properly raised before the district court. Id. The Court nevertheless determined 
the due process issue had been raised below and could be addressed on appeal. 
In the case now before this Court, the due process issue was not contained in Appellants' 
Answer and Counterclaim, nor did the district court make a ruling on the due process issue in any 
of its decisions. It was not raised in any of the briefmg on the motions for summary judgment, nor 
on the motion for reconsideration. Finally, a review of the transcript ofthe hearing on the motion 
for reconsideration reveals that the matters challenged by the Appellants before the district court 
were based squarely on the necessity requirement: "Mr. Harris and I are in basic accord that the 
issue of necessity is the true issue before this Court today." Tr. Motion/or Reconsideration at p.9, 
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LL. 9-11; See also id. p. 20, L. 23 through p. 21, L. 3. Therefore, the due process issue was not 
raised orally by the Appellants in the district court proceedings. 
Under the principles of the Kolar case, the due process issue in the matter now before this 
Court was not raised before the district court, has not been properly preserved on appeal, and 
therefore, the issue has been waived and should not be addressed on appeal. See Krempasky, 150 
Idaho at 236, 245 P.3d at 988, and Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 151 Idaho 266, 
279,255 P.3d 1152, 1166 (2011) ("Because Idaho Power's argument ... was not raised before the 
district court, it will not be addressed on appeal."). 
D. The district court properly recognized this is an easement case, not a water 
rights case, and whether or not a water right was developed with a described 
delivery system is not relevant to whether Respondents can exercise eminent 
domain. 
Appellants devote most of their brief to discussion of water rights documents, and have 
made the same arguments they made previously to the district court that various water rights 
documents require delivery of Respondents' ground water through the Moore Canal. See, e.g., R. 
Vol. 4, p. 751-55 (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration). The argument is that 
this defeats a fmding of reasonable necessity, which would prohibit the exercise of eminent 
domain. 
On many different occasions-most recently in 20 II-this Court has been quite clear that 
easement matters and water rights matters are separate: "In Idaho, ditch rights and water rights 
are separate and independent from one another." Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Highway Dist., 
150 Idaho 675, 249 P.3d 868 (2011); See also Beach Lateral Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 
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Idaho 600, 130 P.3d 1138 (2006) ("Although a ditch easement typically concerns the conveyance 
of water, it is 'a property right apart from and independent of questions of water rights. ') (quoting 
Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users' Ass'n. v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 242, 869 P.2d 554, 559 
(1993». Thus, the "right for the conveyance of water is recognized as a property right apart from 
and independent of the right to the use of the water conveyed therein" and "[e]ach may be owned, 
held and conveyed independently of the other." Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 47, 237 P.2d 93, 
98 (1951). If water rights and ditch rights are as intertwined as Appellant argues, the conveyance 
system would be an element of a water right. This is clearly not the case. See Idaho Code § 
42-1411 (outlining the elements of a water right to be decreed in an adjudication). Otherwise, 
IDWR would have the authority to grant easements if, for descriptive purposes, a delivery system 
is referenced in the water right permit or transfer processes. 
ID WR does not have the authority to grant easements through water right approvals. R. 
Vol. 3, p. 579 (Affidavit of Ernest Carlsen stating IDWR does not have the ability to grant 
easements.); See also R. Vol. 2, p. 431 (condition No. 10 of Telford water bank approval: "([t]his 
rental does not grant any right-of-way or easement to use the diversion works or conveyance works 
of another party."). The position of IDWR is unsurprisingly consistent with the Idaho Supreme 
Court precedent cited above. State authorization to use the State's water does not allow the 
authorized water user to use the water with an automatic easement to convey such water across the 
lands of someone else. Any easement issues must be dealt with separately. 
Taken to its logical extreme, under Appellants' argument, this means Respondents would 
not even need a transport agreement from BLRID to use the Moore Canal if they wanted to 
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because of a descriptive reference in the water rights stating where the water is delivered. Surely 
BLRID would not agree with this legal position. See, e.g., R. Vol. 8, p. 1352 (paragraph 8 of 
transport agreement stating that no ditch or easement rights accrue by virtue of the agreement). 
The district court correctly determined "identification of a delivery system in a permit, license, 
transfer application, or similar document is for descriptive purposes only and has no binding effect 
for purposes of the pending motions." R. Vol. 4, p. 680. This finding is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent. IDWR cannot grant easements. 
Defendants also argue that if the Respondents want to change their delivery system out of 
the Moore Canal, they need to file a transfer with IDWR. Appellants' Briefat 18. But even if we 
presume that a descriptive reference to a delivery system is an element of the water right, and does 
require a transfer under Idaho Code § 42-222, it would not change the outcome of the eminent 
domain matter. Upon reconsideration, Judge Watkins held: 
Whether Respondents' water rights require, as a condition of use, that 
Respondents transport their water via the Moore Canal is a question unrelated to 
the issue before the Court .... Accordingly, Cains mayor may not be correct when 
they assert Respondents must petition IDWR if they seek to change or eliminate 
conditions regarding the delivery of their water. However, the conditions of 
approval listed on [Respondents'] water rights have no bearing on Respondents' 
ability to condemn an easement for the irrigation and reclamation of their arid 
lands. As Cains correctly point out, "[t]he relevant issue is one of necessity." 
R. Vol. 9, 1531 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the descriptive reference to the Moore Canal in some of Respondents' water 
rights does not make the Moore Canal an element of those water rights, and therefore this does not 
defeat Respondents' claim of necessity for the pipeline. Use of the pipeline by Respondents to 
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convey their irrigation water does not violate any part of Respondents' water rights or defeat the 
issue of necessity. Easement matters must be addressed independent of water rights issues. 
E. The District Court did not err by granting Respondents' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment regarding the eminent domain cause of action. Both 
district judges involved in this case correctly determined that Respondents 
satisfied the necessary elements under Idaho law in order to exercise eminent 
domain. 
1. Legal authority and requirements for exercise of eminent domain for a 
buried irrigation pipeline. 
In White v. Marty, 97 Idaho 85, 540 P.2d 270 (1975), the Idaho Supreme Court stated the 
following regarding the condemnation of irrigation easements: 
Chapter 11 of Title 42, Idaho Code, deals with ditch rights of way for the 
irrigation of land. I.C. § 42-1102 gives to landowners a right to an easement or 
right of way across the land of others to supply irrigation water. If the landowner 
of an adjacent parcel refuses to allow such access for irrigation water, the owner of 
land may condemn a right-of-way under the law of eminent domain. I.e. § 
42-1106. 
Id. at 272-73 (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 42-1106 provides as follows: 
In case of the refusal of the owners or claimants of any lands, through 
which any ditch, canal or conduit is proposed to be made or constructed, to allow 
passage thereof, the person or persons desiring the right of way may proceed as in 
the law of eminent domain. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Title 42 of the Idaho Code does not provide an independent process for irrigators who seek 
to exercise eminent domain. Rather, such landowners, who mayor may not own water rights, 
"must proceed under Idaho's law of eminent domain, found in I.C. §§ 7-701 et seq." Canyon 
View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 607, 619 P.2d 122, 125 (1980); See 
also R. Vol. 9, p. 1528-29. 
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Idaho's eminent domain statutes are found at Idaho Code §§ 7-701 to 7-721. Idaho Code 
§ 7-704(1)-(2) sets forth the prerequisites that must be met in order for property to be taken 
pursuant to eminent domain (subparts 3 and 4 are not applicable). They are that the use must be 
authorized by law, and the taking is necessary for that use. Additionally, while not stated in Idaho 
Code § 7-703, Idaho Code § 7-707(7) requires that a complaint for eminent domain must contain a 
certification that good faith negotiations were undertaken by the condemnor prior to its filing. 
Therefore, for purposes of summary judgment, Respondents must demonstrate their sought 
after pipeline easement to convey irrigation water is (1) a use that is authorized by law, (2) that the 
taking is necessary to such use; and (3) that Respondents negotiated in good faith to purchase the 
irrigation pipeline easement prior to filing suit for condemnation. As determined by the district 
court-first by Judge Tingey and then by Judge Watkins-Respondents are entitled to summary 
judgment on each of these issues. 
2. The use for which Appellants seek to use condemnation is an irrigation 
pipeline easement, which is a use authorized by law, even by private 
individuals or entities. 
Respondents' burden on summary judgment is to demonstrate that they meet the "use" 
requirement of Idaho's eminent domain statutes. This requires Respondents to demonstrate (1) a 
right-of-way or easement for the irrigation pipeline is subject to condemnation, (2) the purpose of 
the easement or right of way-conveyance of agricultural irrigation water through a buried 
pipeline-is an authorized use under Idaho law, and (3) the exercise of eminent domain may be 
exercised by private individuals under Idaho law for the specific purpose of conveying irrigation 
water to arid lands. As set forth below, Respondents meet each of these requirements. 
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a. An easement or right of way is subject to a taking. 
Idaho Code § 7-703 sets forth the types of property that may be taken under Idaho's 
eminent domain statutes. The property interest sought by Respondents in this case is a right of 
way or easement for an irrigation pipeline, which will occupy real property owned by Appellants. 
Idaho Code § 7 -703( 1) provides that one class of property subject to a taking is "all real property 
belonging to any person." The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that "[i]n order to assist 
owners of water rights whose lands are remote from the water source, the state has partially 
delegated its powers of eminent domain to private individuals. LC. §§ 42-1102 and 1106. These 
statutes permit landlocked individuals to condemn a right of way through the lands of others for 
purposes of irrigation." Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 
607, 619 P.2d 122, 125 (1980) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Because 
Respondents seek to condemn a right of way, which is permitted in Idaho as a matter of law, 
Respondents meet this requirement and can therefore exercise the power of eminent domain. 
b. The purpose of the right of way-conveyance of agricultural 
irrigation water-is an authorized use under Idaho Code § 
7-701, and eminent domain can be exercised for this purpose 
even by private persons/entities. 
Idaho Code § 7-701 sets forth the uses for which eminent domain is authorized, and it 
specifically authorizes condemnation of private land for "pipes." Idaho Code § 7-701(3). 
Because Respondents are seeking to obtain a right of way for a pipeline, the use for which they 
seek to exercise under Idaho law is expressly authorized by statute. 
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Regarding the specific use of "irrigation" the pipeline will serve, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has recognized that "[t]he irrigation and reclamation of arid lands is a well recognized public use, 
... even if the irrigation project is ostensibly intended to benefit only private individuals. Canyon 
View Irrigation Co., 101 Idaho at 607, 619 P.2d at 125 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). Additionally, this Court has stated that the authority of irrigators to proceed under 
condemnation "govern[ s] the exercise of what is commonly called a private eminent domain 
power." Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122, 1124,739 P.2d 421,423 (Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis 
added). Therefore, the right to condemn a right of way for an irrigation pipeline is an authorized 
use under Idaho law, even ifit is for private individuals. Respondents therefore meet this eminent 
domain requirement. 
c. Respondents lands are "arid" lands, and therefore qualify as 
lands that can be serviced by a pipeline placed by eminent 
domain. 
In the Canyon View Irrigation Co. case discussed above, the court stated the "irrigation and 
reclamation of arid lands is a well recognized public use, ... " Canyon View Irrigation Co., 101 
Idaho at 607,619 P.2d at 125. Keying in on the use of the term "arid," the Appellants contend 
that Respondents "lands are not 'arid' lands; their land had been developed and irrigated for thirty 
or more years." Appellants' Brief at 29. Stated another way, Appellants argue the climate 
classification of arid land changes to non-arid lands once irrigation occurs. 
This argument was similarly raised before the district court, who analyzed it as follows: 
[T]he Idaho Court of Appeals stated in Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 
P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985) that dry and arid climates are those "where irrigation is 
necessary in order to cultivate the soil." Thus, where a parcel of land has been 
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irrigated in the past is irrelevant in detennining whether the land is arid. The 
important question, rather, is whether irrigation is required to cultivate the soil now 
and in the future. 
In this case, there is no dispute [Respondents] need irrigation water to 
cultivate their land. This Court concludes [Respondents]' land is arid, and 
irrigation of that land is a public use for which the law of eminent domain may be 
evoked. 
R. Vol. 9, p. 1530-31. 
The district court's analysis was correct. The mere existence of the need for water to 
cultivate crops on Respondents' lands demonstrates their lands are arid. Arid lands are those that, 
without irrigation, would not be able to produce a crop. Land does not lose its arid nature because 
it is irrigated. The need for irrigation demonstrates it is arid. Scott Slocum ofPU Ranch testified 
that his land would not produce crops without artificial irrigation, and is therefore arid under Idaho 
law. R. Vol. 4, p. 774 (Deposition of Scott Slocum, at p. 14, LL.8-17). The Supreme Court 
should uphold the district court's decision in this regard. 
3. Respondents' taking of a right of way on Appellants' property is 
reasonably necessary for Respondents' use, as there are no other 
reasonable alternatives for Respondents to convey their ground water. 
a. Reasonable necessity standard. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals case of Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122, 739 P.2d 421 (Ct. 
App. 1987) provides that the necessity required for eminent domain is one of "reasonable 
necessity." This standard has "no fonnulaic meaning," but one seeking to exercise eminent 
domain need not show that a "legally available route is absolutely necessary." Erickson, 112 
Idaho at 1124, 739 P.2d at 423 (emphasis added). Therefore, "necessity" in the context of 
eminent domain means "reasonable necessity," not absolute necessity. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF AT 22 
As set forth below, while necessity is generally a question offact, there is no dispute offact 
in these circlUllstances that Respondents had neither legally available nor reasonable alternatives 
available to them to convey their irrigation water. Respondents had no legal authorization for use 
of the Moore Canal in 2010. In addition, reasonable necessity exists because of (1) the permissive 
and adhesion-like nature of the transport agreements and the BLRID's past instance of unilaterally 
terminating them, (2) the fact that Sorensen was risking forfeiture with one of his water rights and 
BLRID would not provide him a transport agreement, (3) the shortcomings in the methodology of 
the BLRlD accounting system in the Moore Canal and elsewhere in the district, (4) the conveyance 
loss savings associated with the pipeline and lined ditch project, and (5) the minimal impact of the 
pipeline on Appellants' property. 
b. Because the transport agreements were to sunset as called for in 
the BLRID settlement agreement for the ground water rights of 
Telford and PU Ranch, and because of Sorensen's lack of a 
transport agreement, the Moore Canal was not an option for 
Respondents to transport their water in 2010, the year the 
eminent domain action commenced. 
The settlement agreement entered into between Respondents and BLRlD speaks for itself. 
The parties jointly agreed that Respondents' existing transport agreements should sunset at the end 
of 2009. Therefore, at the time the eminent domain lawsuit was filed in 2010, Respondents had 
no permission to use the Moore Canal because they had no transport agreements in place. There 
was therefore no "legally available" route to use. Appellants claim that the termination was done 
by Respondents in a premeditated fashion in order to create their own necessity for condemnation, 
but this makes little sense. At the time the settlement agreement was entered into, no objection to 
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the pipeline had been raised by Appellants, and therefore, eminent domain was not even 
contemplated. Without permission to use the Moore Canal in 2010 when the eminent domain 
lawsuit was filed, it was not a viable option. No other options for conveying water, other than the 
pipeline, were available. Based on this fact alone, Respondents have reasonable necessity to 
condemn the pipeline right of way, and summary judgment on this issue is appropriate. 
c. Because of the permissive and adhesion-like nature of the 
transport agreements, the BLRID's recent instance of 
unilaterally terminating them, and the precipitous nature of the 
BLRID's transport agreements in place at the time the eminent 
domain action was commenced, there was reasonable necessity 
for the pipeline. 
Despite the plain language of the settlement agreement, Appellants insist that BLRID 
would now execute new transport agreements. Whether they would now is irrelevant to the 
situation existing in 2010 when there were no transport agreements in place. Furthermore, the 
transport agreements are permissive licenses, and are revocable. See Rowan v. Riley, 139 Idaho 
49, 72 PJd 889 (2003). Despite this insistence that the BLRID would enter into new ones, no 
evidence has been provided that the BLRID board would approve new transport agreements, even 
in 2012 or 2013. Appellants insist that Manager Rindfleisch is the decision-maker on these 
transport agreements, but he has clearly stated he does not make those decisions. R. Vol. 5, p. 
877-81 (quotation of Rindfleisch deposition testimony in briefing to the district court). 
Furthermore, the question is not whether the Moore Canal is available as an option, but 
whether the transport agreement option is even reasonable. It is not. New transport agreements 
remain permissive and adhesion-like in nature. These transport agreements are non-negotiable, 
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are set for a term of years, and are revocable. Expiration of these transport agreements allows 
BLRID to impose new conditions on landowners based on matters they determine need to be 
changed. The agreements are also not assignable, and require execution of the newest transport 
agreement incarnation if a new person purchases the property subject to the transport agreement. 
See, e.g., R. Vol. 8, p. 1323-1450 (various iterations of transport agreements). Respondents 
cannot invest millions of dollars in farm planting, cultivation, equipment, etc., and remain subject 
to the whims and emotions of the BLRID who can revoke the permission at any time and amend 
provisions of the transport agreements where Respondents have no say in their drafting. 
As an example of this, Respondent Sorensen was the subject of a separate litigation 
proceeding with the BLRID at the same time the matter now on appeal was in its early stages. 
BLRlD unilaterally terminated two transport agreements held by two other landowners, Leon 
Folkman and Isom Acres Ltd. Partnership, whose land was leased at the time by Sorensen (Butte 
County Case No. CV-2009-94). 
The dispute began when Sorensen complained that water diversions were not being 
accounted for in the Eastside-Island-Munsey Canal portion of their system (the "ElM" system). 
The transport agreement in place at the time said that the seepage, or "shrink", was supposed to be 
for "losses for seepage and evaporation" and that all users on the ditch were supposed to have 
measuring devices in order to properly calculate diversions. In response to those complaints, 
BLRlD alleged Folkman and Isom themselves did not have appropriate measuring devices and 
controlling works, and terminated their agreements. This was done despite the fact that the 
Folkman and Isom diversions were substantially reworked in 2008 and 2009 to allow for use of the 
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most sophisticated type of measuring device, a polysonic flow meter, and could be controlled. R. 
Vol. 3, p. 478 (photograph of diversion system with polysonic meter attached). 
During the litigation, Manager Rindfleisch admitted he did not recognize many diversions 
on the EIM system, and admitted that a number of the diversions did not have measuring devices.4 
R. Vol. 3, p. 474-75 (Rindfleisch Deposition at p. 95, L. 3 through p. 103, L. 20). Yet other water 
users who did not have a measuring device did not have their transport agreements terminated. 
The disparate treatment of Folkman and Isom is even more problematic because the BLRID ditch 
rider assigned to the ElM canal, Kiley Smith, did not believe the measuring devices and diversion 
system were problematic, but he was not consulted before the transport agreements were 
terminated. R. Vol. 3, p. 492 (Kiley Smith Deposition at p. 84, L. 9 through p. 85, L. 12). 
Despite this evidence, the transport agreements were still terminated. 
In response to that litigation, BLRID amended its form transport agreement to its benefit. 
As to conveyance loss calculations, the provisions were amended to provide: 
The parties covenant and agree that the loss of water supplies conveyed pursuant to 
this agreement will be determined by the District by using reasonable calculations 
of evaporation, operational losses and conveyance losses as they are similarly 
applied to other water supplies co-mingle in the same common canal( s) . . . 
District's methodology of calculating losses, now existing or as hereafter modified, 
shall be used to calculate the distribution of water. 
R. Vol. 3, p. 484 (~5 of transport agreement). This change now expressly gave the BLRID the 
ability to charge unaccounted for water as conveyance losses to the ground water user (this 
methodology is discussed below). 
4 As explained in further detail below, the unaccounted-for diversions resulted in much higher conveyance loss 
allocations to Respondents because the water pumped into the ElM system by Folkman and Isom was being taken by 
others, but was accounted as conveyance loss. 
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Additionally, Paragraph 11.2 of the proposed transport agreement provides that breaches 
of the agreement are determined by BLRID alone, and if a breach is determined, only a ten (10) 
day notice of the termination is provided, placing farmers in a difficult position. It grants no 
property rights to the landowner, and even expressly states so at Paragraph 9 (which is also 
included in prior versions of the transport agreements). 
Finally, paragraph 16 of the transport agreement provides that "[i]n the event District is 
required to obtain legal counsel to enforce this agreement or file or defend a suit alleging a breach 
of this agreement or seeking to terminate this agreement, Landowner agrees to pay the attorney's 
fees and costs incurred by the District." R. Vol. 3, p. 787. Thus, if the ground water user sues 
BLRID, and is even found to be right, he must still pay BLRID' s attorneys fees. In response to 
Appellants' defense of these provisions on summary judgment, the district court stated: "Well, I 
don't know how you can say that. Certainly an attorney fee provision to a prevailing party is very 
common, but ifthere's no prevailing party analysis, to me that's a horse of a different color." Tr. 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 127, LL. 4-8; See also Id., p. 102, LL. 4-12. Ultimately, the 
district court was troubled with the permissive nature and onerous provisions of the transport 
agreements, and held that certain conditions in the transport agreements were "undesirable if not 
unconscionable." R. Vol. 4, p. 681. The district court summarized it best when it stated 
"[a]nyone intending to expend significant resources in reclaiming arid lands would certainly have 
to question the wisdom of doing so if the only way to irrigate the land was through the District's 
Moore Canal." R. Vol. 4, p. 681. The district court concluded, "while use of the Canal may have 
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been considered viable historically, the Court fmds from the evidence that there is reasonable 
necessity for use of the pipeline." R. Vol. 4, p. 682. 
Defendants argue that Respondents have other transport agreements with the BLRID, and 
therefore, because ofthe existence of these other transport agreements, there is no necessity for the 
pipeline. This does not negate the fact that as to the specific water rights previously permitted to 
be delivered through the Moore Canal, no transport agreements existed. Further, as to these other 
transport agreements, the factual circumstances surrounding their use differ. For example, one of 
the ground water transport agreements that Telford entered into in 2010 was because he had no 
other choice due to litigation between him and a joint well owner named Harold Babcock. This 
matter was settled in February of20l0 (Case No. CV-20I0-2l), and water will now be diverted 
into the same UC Canal system the pipeline at issue in this matter diverts into. Telford will 
therefore avoid the similar problems experienced with the shrink calculation and actual losses in 
the Moore Canal evident in this matter. 
The other transport agreements for PU Ranch and Mitchell Sorensen referenced in 
Appellants' briefing notably are for Big Lost River surface water, not ground water. The 
diversion point is many miles away from the Respondents' places of use, more than it is for their 
ground water diversions. At this point, it is not economical for Respondents to pipe their surface 
water the length of the entire canal, and therefore, they simply have no other alternative at this time 
but to accept the permissive nature of the BLRID transport agreements to deliver that water. 
However, acceptance of an inferior delivery system for the time being does not mean Respondents 
would be prohibited from condemning an easement in the future for these rights as well. 
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Furthermore, we note that these surface transport agreements introduced by Appellants 
prior to their motion for reconsideration do not contain the attorney's fees provision to pay any and 
all attorney's fees ifthere is a dispute, even if the landowner is correct. Nor do these agreements 
contain the recent amendments that change the calculation of conveyance loss. These provisions 
were particularly objectionable to the district court. The transport agreement process will require 
Respondents to sign the latest version of these transport agreements, which could contain the 
above provisions. This allows for the potential further imposition of more unreasonable 
provisions, and therefore, this is not a reasonable option for Respondents. 
In short, the existing surface water transport agreements and the Telford ground water 
transport agreement (involving the Babcock matter) do not defeat a finding of reasonable 
necessity. As described below, even if a transport agreement is an option in the future, and 
BLRID acts contrary to the settlement agreement they signed, the pipeline provides the 
Respondents with the ability to better measure, utilize, and make beneficial use of their water and 
irrigate their arid lands for the production of crops, which further supports a fmding of necessity. 
d. BLRID would not enter into a transport agreement with 
Sorensen, who was risking forfeiture with one of his water 
rights, and therefore, reasonable necessity existed for the 
pipeline. 
Respondents determined that a cooperative project between them would allow Sorensen to 
divert water from his well pursuant to his water right, which Sorensen had not done for nearly five 
years given BLRID's position that it would not enter into a transport agreement with Sorensen. 
Sorensen's water right was close to being unused for five years, risking forfeiture of the water 
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right. See Idaho Code § 42-222(2). The last time the water right was used was in the fall of 
2004. 
At the time the project concept was thought of, Sorensen did not have a transport 
agreement, and BLRID would not permit him to use the Moore Canal. R. Vol. 1, p. 117-19 
(Mitchell Sorensen Deposition at p.46, L. 5 through p. 49, L.14; p. 69, L. 1 through p. 71, L. 
14). Thus, even with prior use of the so-called Old Moss Well, BLRID would not permit its 
further diversion into the Moore Canal based on the position that the well had been abandoned, 
despite a recent decree in the Snake River Basin Adjudication for the parent right of Mr. 
Sorensen's Water Right No. 34-13841 (which received a partial decree in the SRBA on June 22, 
2004) that al!:thorized use of the Old Moss well for diversion of this water right. Sorensen 
therefore had no ability to convey this water right given BLRID's position on the matter, and the 
pipeline was his only option. He certainly had reasonable necessity for the pipeline. 
e. Reasonable necessity is also evident because of the 
shortcomings in the methodology of the BLRID accounting 
system in the Moore Canal and in other parts of the district, 
which over-estimates conveyances losses and negatively impacts 
Respondents, who are at the tail end of the Moore Canal. 
As set forth in the factual background above, the Respondents moved forward and installed 
the pipeline in order to avoid commingling of water in the Moore Canal, which often resulted in 
Respondents being charged significant, highly variable, and unexplainable conveyance losses on 
their ground water by BLRID. In deposition testimony, Manager Rindfleisch described what 
shrink is, and it is more than conveyance losses and evaporation. It includes unaccounted for 
water, which could be water that is stolen or improperly measured. R. Vol. 3, p. 472-73 
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(Rindfleisch Deposition at p. 74, L. 24 through p. 79, L. 17). The spreadsheet example prepared 
by Respondents' counsel referred to in Mr. Rindfleisch's testimony is found at R. Vol. 3, p. 480, 
and it illustrates that accurate accounting and measurement is essential in order to convey 
Respondents' ground water. Otherwise, Respondents' pumped ground water is taken, accounted 
as conveyance loss, which results is less water available at their farms and less crop production. 
Even during the deposition of Manager Rindfleisch taken at the end of 2010, once the 
summary judgment had been entered, he admitted to just finding out about a diversion on the 
Moore Canal that did not have a measuring device. R. Vol. 4, p. 802 (Rindfleisch Deposition p. 
46, L. 13 through p. 47, L. 6). For years, this diversion has no doubt, at times, been taking ground 
water pumped at Respondents' sole expense, which was then accounted to Respondents as 
conveyance losses. Allowing the Respondents to have their own private system-and avoiding 
the commingled supplies in the Moore Canal-has allowed Respondents to better measure, utilize, 
and make beneficial use of their water. The district court specifically held "the evidence 
establishes that use of the Canal has been very inefficient in delivering water to Respondents such 
that they have been unable to irrigate the full amount of acreage authorized by the water rights ... " 
and that "through the pipeline more water will actually reach Respondents' property from the 
wells thereby allowing Respondents to reclaim and/or irrigate more acres." R. Vol. 4, p. 681-82. 
The court was likewise troubled because of "the evidence that Plaintiffs would bear the brunt of 
stolen water as well as unmeasured or improperly measured water diversions." R. Vol. 4, p. 681. 
There is no evidence or argument advanced by Appellants that should change these conclusions. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF AT 31 
f. The conveyance loss savings associated with the pipeline project 
are reasonable and necessary under Idaho law, and consistent 
with declared legislative policy. 
This Court has stated that "[p ]lacement of irrigation ditches and underground pipes or 
addition of gates, collars and safety screens, is common and necessary in modem irrigation 
practices .... " Abbott v. Nampa School District No., 131, 119 Idaho 544, 551, 808 P.2d 1289, 
1296 (1991) (emphasis added). This quote is from a 1991 case, decided over two decades ago, 
where this Court wisely recognized the need of a modem society to be more efficient in conveying 
water. 
Similarly, the Idaho Legislature has recognized the necessity for water conservation in 
Idaho. See Idaho Code § 42-250 ("The legislature fmds that voluntary water conservation 
practices and projects can advance the policy of the state of Idaho to promote and encourage the 
conservation, development, augmentation and utilization of the water resources of this state. The 
legislature deems it appropriate, therefore, to encourage and support voluntary water conservation 
practices and projects." This includes "reductions in conveyance losses."). 
Respondents' pipeline and delivery system conserves water in both the pipe and the 
partially-lined ditch in the UC Canal. Respondents intend to line more of the ditch as finances 
permit. It could be argued that the conveyance loss savings alone demonstrate reasonable 
necessity in these situations, but based on the other reasons explained above, the court does not 
need to decide whether conveyance loss savings alone are sufficient to establish necessity. 
g. The benefits derived from the pipeline to Respondents are not 
outweighed by possible damage or inconvenience to the 
Appellants. 
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In Erickson v. Amoth, this Court held that when considering reasonable necessity, ''the 
benefits derived from the easement must not be outweighed by possible damage or inconvenience 
to the owners of the servient property." Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122,423, 739 P.2d 421, 
1124 (Ct. App. 1987). In placing the pipeline, Respondents did so in as responsible manner as 
possible in a place that made logical sense, and buried the pipeline to minimize the impacts to 
Appellants' property. Respondents explored alternative routes for placement of the pipeline. 
Unfortunately, Appellants own nearly two miles of the old railroad right of way both north and 
south of the location of the pipeline. Respondents have to cross property at some point, and chose 
to locate the pipeline in its current location because it provided the most direct route for connecting 
the three wells to the pipeline. Additionally, because the pipeline is buried, Appellants are free to 
graze over top of it, dry farm it, or make other use of it because the pipeline does not occupy the 
property's surface. 
As part of the reasonable necessity analysis, the district court appropriately followed 
Erickson v. Amoth, and considered whether benefits derived from the right of way were 
outweighed by the damage to the property: "The subject pipeline crosses Defendants property 
near where the Moore Canal crosses. There is no evidence that the pipeline would have any 
material effect on Defendants' use or intended use of the property. Additionally, the evidence 
establishes that the location of the pipeline is the most logical and reasonable under the 
circumstances." R. Vol. 4, p. 682 (emphasis added). The Appellants have not provided 
evidence that would refute the district court's findings on this issue, and therefore, the district 
court's decision should be upheld. 
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h. Conclusion. 
Given the lack of transport agreements for Respondents in 2010, the permissive and 
adhesion-like nature of the transport agreements, BLRID's past instance of unilaterally and 
unreasonably terminating transport agreements, the risk of forfeiture to Sorensen's water right, the 
deficiencies in the methodology of the BLRID accounting system, the conveyance loss savings 
associated with the pipeline project, and the minimal impact to Appellants' property, reasonable 
necessity exists. Because eminent domain can and must be exercised, it was not an error for the 
district court to deny summary judgment on the trespass issue. See Appellants' Brief at 30. The 
district court's decision on these issues should be upheld in all respects. 
F. Respondents offered to purchase the right of way from Appellants at values 
well above fair market value, which offers have been rejected. There is no 
dispute of fact Respondents have negotiated in good faith, and the district 
court's decision in this regard should be upheld. 
As explained above, prior to the filing of a complaint for eminent domain, the Respondents 
must certify that they have negotiated in good faith to purchase the property to be taken. 
Regarding this certification, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that this requirement is not to be 
"lightly regarded." Idaho Power Co. v. Lettunich, 100 Idaho 582,582-83,602 P.2d 540,540-41 
(1979) (quoting State v. Bair, 83 Idaho 475, 480, 365 P.2d 216, 219 (1961))(citations omitted). 
However, this Court has also held that to require a condemning entity to continue negotiations 
"after the owners themselves close the negotiations by refusal to discuss matters or consider bona 
fide offers would be unrealistic." Southside Water and Sewer Dist. v. Murphy, 97 Idaho 881, 883, 
555 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1976). 
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Appellants purchased the property through which the Pipeline traversed in 1996 for $1,500 
per acre. R. VoL 1, p. 227. Despite this amount, the Appellants' initial offer of $150,000 for a 
buried pipeline easement, which would occupy .047 acres underground, was one hundred times 
the amount they paid for an entire acre. Just before the lawsuit was filed, Respondents offered 
five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), an amount that is one thousand percent the value that Appellants 
ultimately stipulated to as being the value of the easement. The offers for purchase of the easement 
both before and after the litigation was commenced (in May of 2010) are contained at R. VoL 1, 
pp. 235-244, 181-198, and summarized in table form at R. Vol. 1, p. 69. 
Regarding the $150,000 offer, Appellants argue "Mr. Cain reafflrmed his position in that 
regard when asked why he offered to sell the [Respondents] an easement for the 'ridiculous' price 
of$150,000. When asked if that offer was "a little ridiculous," Cain responded: It was no more 
ridiculous than taking my land, but I really didn't want to sell it." Appellants' Brief at 43-44. 
This statement from Appellants does not accurately reflect the record because the question was not 
asked by counsel as represented. The "ridiculous" term was not suggested by Respondents' 
counsel, but was the very word used by Mr. Cain to describe the offer when asked if the $150,000 
offer was based on an appraised value. Here is the exchange: 
Q: (BY MR. HARRIS): The letter that we marked as No. 16, is that the letter that 
asks for $150,000 for the easement? 
A. Uh-huh. Yes. Sorry. 
Q. Okay. And was that based on an appraised value? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. What was it based upon? 
A. Technically, I didn't want the pipe in; so I gave you a ridiculous price. 
Q. Okay. So you admit that that was a little ridiculous? 
A. It was no more ridiculous than taking my land, but I really didn't want to sell it. 
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R. Vol. 3, p. 521 (Don Cain Deposition, p. 197, LL. 5-18). This statement was noted by the 
district court in its analysis of the good faith element. R. Vol. 4, p. 683. 
Appellants argue that the good faith negotiations were untimely because they were not 
undertaken prior to the pipeline being installed. Easement purchase negotiations were not 
undertaken because, of course, Respondents believed they had authorization for the pipeline to be 
installed. Once an objection was received, however, Respondents immediately began the good 
faith negotiation process well before their Complaint was filed. The same argument of 
untimeliness was made before the district court, and the district court determined on summary 
judgment that Respondents met the requirement to engage in good faith negotiations because the 
offers occurred before the eminent domain complaint was filed. R. Vol. 4, p. 682-83 ("A plain 
reading of § 7-707 indicates that the requirement of good faith effort to resolve the dispute must 
only be made prior to the filing of the lawsuit.") 
At the time the district court entered summary judgment, the remaining issue was the 
determination of damages, and payment of just compensation. The trial on the damages issue was 
vacated to allow Appellants more time for discovery, and the Respondents' appraisal report was 
introduced in response to Appellants' motion for reconsideration because Appellants stipulated to 
the determination of just compensation for the easement submitted by Respondents in the amount 
of $500.00 ($27.55 actual damages) based upon their appraiser's report: "Given that posture, 
Cains will stipulate to the alleged amount of damages asserted in the appraisal report for purposes 
of avoiding the time and expense of additional evidentiary hearings." R. Vol. 4, p. 759; See also 
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R. Vol. 5, p. 939. (expert concludes that easement has an actual value of$27.55, but that "no one 
would pay only $27.55 to purchase a permanent easement. .. we conclude that the subject has a 
token value of $500. This amount would represent the time and effort required for the property 
owner to sign an easement.") The fact that the Appellants would stipulate to this amount, which 
was much less than offers made previously, further demonstrates that Respondents engaged in 
good faith negotiations. Appellants referred to the amounts offered by Respondents as a 
"pittance," Appellants' Brief at 31, but the evidence provided through the appraisal belies this 
claim, particularly when this court considers that the just compensation amount was stipulated to 
by Appellants. Given the undisputed facts of the negotiations engaged in by Respondents with 
Appellants, Respondents engaged in good faith negotiations. 
G. The district court did not err in rmding that Telford Lands LLC has standing 
in this matter. 
On the issue of the standing of Telford Lands LLC, the arguments in Appellants , Briefon 
this issue are the same as those raised previously. The district court determined that Telford did 
have standing on account of his authorized water supply bank lease approved by IDWR "whereby 
Telford may draw water from a well east of Defendants property, which water would then be 
conveyed through the pipeline and desired easement. ... where Telford would clearly derive a 
benefit from conveying water from the P.U. Ranch Well, such confers standing on Telford." R. 
Vol. 4, p. 678. A water supply bank lease is authorized pursuant to the provisions of IDAPA 
37.02.03. 
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Appellants argue they are "unaware of any legal precedent that would authorize a tenant 
with a lease for a term of years to institute eminent domain proceedings in order to obtain a 
permanent easement on another's property." Appellants' Briefat 39. This claim asks the wrong 
question. The correct question is whether Mr. Telford is a landowner with the need to convey 
irrigation water under Idaho Code §§ 42-1102 and 1106. The district court held the plain 
language of these statutes "gives landowners the right to proceed under the law of erninentdomain 
if certain conditions exist." R. Vol. 9, p. 1529 (italics in original). Because Telford is a 
landowner with a need for irrigation water, and possessed a water bank lease for use of Sorensen's 
well, he has standing to be a part of this eminent domain proceeding. 
H. Appellants cannot assert on appeal that Respondent's Complaint was deficient 
because it did not have a surveyed legal description when Appellants were 
given an opportunity to address Respondents' proposed surveyed legal 
description, and chose not to challenge the surveyed description. 
Appellants allege that Respondents' Complaint for eminent domain was deficient because 
it did not contain a surveyed legal description. Appellants' Brief at 34. The Complaint 
contained a written description and detailed GIS map of where the proposed easement was located, 
and the map even showed the easement over an aerial photo with Appellants' home in the photo. 
R. Vol. 8, p. 1288. Idaho Code § 7-707(4) only requires a description and depiction of "the 
location, general route and termini, and must be accompanied by maps thereof." In order to better 
describe the easement, as provided in Idaho Code § 7-705, Respondents' counsel made it clear at 
the motion for reconsideration hearing that if the court were to deny the motion for 
reconsideration, the Respondents would more precisely define the easement by survey as it was 
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generally depicted on the map and described in the appraisal report, which the Appellants 
stipulated to. Ir. Motion for Reconsideration, p. 21, LL. 6-19. The appraiser's valuation was 
based on a value of 2,000 square feet (a 20 ft. x 100 ft. easement), and the surveyed legal 
description was intended to more precisely defme it. R. Vol. 5, p. 908. 
Nevertheless, Appellants objected to the proposed judgment with the surveyed legal 
description. R. Vol. 6, p. 1022. The objection was granted, and the court requested the parties to 
submit evidence of the surveyed legal description by a certain date, and allowed a hearing if it was 
requested by one of the parties. R. Vol. 6, p.l 027 (describing the court's order on this issue). 
Respondents submitted briefmg and affidavits. R. Vol. 6, p. 1026. Appellants did not timely 
submit anything. One day later, Appellants submitted a Notice of Objection to Respondents' 
Memorandum and Affidavits, asking that the hearing not occur. R. Vol. 6, p. 1072. 
Appellants had an opportunity to present argument on this issue, but elected not to. The 
district court ultimately issued its order on this issue, following the arguments provided by 
Respondents. R. Vol. 6, p. 1075; See also R. Vol. 6, p. 1026-71 (Respondents' briefmg and 
evidence). The district court noted that no evidence or argument was presented by Appellants, 
and then summarized that the Appellants "simply object to the Court using a legal description of 
the property that was not included in [Respondents'] complaint." R. Vol. 6, 1075-76. The 
district court correctly cited to and discussed Idaho Code § 7-707 (4), and found that Respondents' 
Complaint contained the necessary information. The district court also correctly determined that 
"[Appellants] never sought a more defmite statement or claimed that they didn't know the location 
of the pipeline. . . [Appellants] have failed to challenge the legal description provided by 
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[Respondents] other than to argue untimeliness." R. Vol. 6, p. 1076. The district court thereafter 
executed the proposed judgment, and the hearing on the legal description was vacated. Id. (the 
Final Order and Judgment and Order of Condemnation is found at R. Vol. 6, p. 1078-84). The 
Appellants had their opportunity to participate in a hearing on this issue, and they voluntarily 
elected not to provide evidence or argument. They cannot now claim the district court erred 
because they elected not to participate. This Court should therefore uphold the district court's 
fmdings on this issue. 
I. The district court did not err by denying Appellants their costs and attorney's 
fees. 
The district court discussed Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 
878,673 P.2d 1067, 1072 (1983) in its attorney's fees analysis, and coupled it with a prevailing 
party analysis. This is an appropriate analysis under Idaho law. See State ex rel Ohman v. Ivan 
H Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 828-29, 820 P.2d 695,698-99 (1991) and Lower Payette 
Ditch Company v. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291, _ 271 P.3d 689,694 (2012). 
The issue of whether there was a prevailing party was fully briefed before the district court. 
R. Vol. 6, pp. 1130-51, 1176-96. The matter was then decided by Judge Tingey after a review of 
the record and applicable case law, and his analysis demonstrates he carefully reviewed the issues. 
R. Vol. 7, p. 1251. In Appellants' Brief, there is no discussion of the abuse of discretion 
standard of review, and how Judge Tingey may have abused his discretion. See Hopkins v. 
Troutner, 134 Idaho 445, 447, 4 PJd 557,559 (2000). 
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There were four claims brought in the Respondents' Complaint, three of which were 
alternatives to keep the pipeline in place. The oral agreement theory was rejected on summary 
judgment, the eminent domain action was accepted, and the estoppel argument was disposed 
of-not on the merits, but because there was a remedy at law available to Respondents. R. Vol. 4, 
p.685. Additionally, on the civil conspiracy claim, Respondents admittedly were not able to find 
any third party witnesses to the self-help actions that destroyed the pipeline and whether others 
participated. Consequently, no evidence could be presented on this issue, and Appellants 
prevailed. The district court did not abuse its discretion under a prevailing party analysis as both 
parties prevailed on the mixed claims. 
J. Respondents should be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. Rules 40 and 41. Additionally, Appellants 
should not be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
In order for costs and fees on appeal to be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121 and LA.R. 
Rules 40 and 41, the "argument shall contain the contentions of the respondent with respect to the 
issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts 
of the transcript and recorded relied upon." LA.R. 35(b )(6); Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318, 
_,281 PJd 1096, 1103 (2012). "Normally, we will only award attorney fees on appeal under 
[Idaho Code § 12-121] 'when this court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. ", Lower Payette Ditch 
Company v. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291, _ 271 P.3d 689, 695 (2012) (quoting Rueth v. State, 103 
Idaho 74, 81, 644 P.2d 1333, 1340 (1982). Conversely, "[a]ttorney fees will not be awarded 
under that statute 'where the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine 
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issue of law was presented. ' Id. Fees have been awarded when an appeal simply asks this court 
to second-guess the district court without presenting reasoned arguments. Id. at _, 271 P.3d at 
695; See also Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, _, 272 P.3d 527,534 (2012). 
In this case, we believe the appeal has been brought merely to invite this Court to 
second-guess the evidence. The matter was decided by two capable district judges, and the 
arguments from Appellants in both instances were found to be unpersuasive. On appeal, the same 
arguments have been replicated. 
In addition, many of the arguments made by Appellants on appeal are unreasonable. As 
addressed above, Appellants, on appeal, (1) have argued from evidence stricken by the district 
court, (2) raised a due process issue for the first time, (3) maintained this case is a water rights case 
when this Court has made a clear distinction between water rights cases and easement cases, (4) 
maintained that IDWR can grant easements, (5) argued that the Moore Canal was a viable option 
for Respondents in 2010 even though the settlement agreement clearly provided no transport 
agreements were in place, (6) argued that the decision to have the 2009 transport agreements 
sunset was premeditated even though there was no objection to the pipeline from Appellants until 
a month and a half after the settlement agreement was executed, (7) maintained that Respondents' 
irrigated lands are "not arid" because they have been irrigated historically thereby changing their 
climatic classification, and (8) argued that the district court erred by including a surveyed legal 
description in a final order when Appellants elected not to submit arguments or evidence once the 
district court provided them the opportunity to do so. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF AT 42 
Additionally, the Respondents were forced to file this lawsuit and assert eminent domain 
on account of Mr. Cain's self-help actions right at the time Respondents needed the pipeline 
most-just before the irrigation season. And this was done even after Cain filed a small claims 
action against the Respondents to potentially resolve the matter in an appropriate forum. 
Self-help is strongly discouraged in any property dispute, as described in Weitz v. Green, 148 
Idaho 851, 864, 230 P.3d 743, 756 (2010) ("In short, parties who attempt to solve a property 
dispute through their own forceful action do so at their own peril."). The "peril" referred to in this 
case should be interpreted to include an award of fees and costs in the Court's discretion. Fees 
and costs on appeal should be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121, LA.R. 40, and LA.R. 41. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons set forth above, the district court decisions-authored by two district 
judges-regarding the ability of Respondents to exercise eminent domain should be upheld. 
Respondents should be allowed to continue conveyance of their irrigation water through the 
superior system they have constructed and be allowed to continue with their enhanced ability to 
farm by receiving as much of their pumped ground water as possible. In the alternative, and in the 
unlikely event the district court's decisions are reversed, Respondents, at a minimum, are entitled 
to a trial on the merits to prove the elements discussed herein, particularly that of reasonable 
necessity. 
In addition, Appellants should not be allowed to use substantive evidence on this appeal 
that was stricken by the district court. Further, the due process issue raised for the first time on 
this appeal should not be considered, and Appellants should not be permitted to challenge the 
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inclusion of the surveyed legal description of the easement because they failed to participate when 
provided the opportunity to do so by the district court. Fees and costs should not be awarded to 
the Appellants under either Accarequi or under a prevailing party analysis, and on appeal, 
Respondents should be awarded their attorney fees for defending against this appeal. 
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